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I. Introduction
Apart from a didactic aspect of "university policy,"' there are also
methodological and comparative reasons which justify the choice of this
subject. First of all, it illustrates the difficulties with which a continental
European jurist is faced when trying to fight a traditional manner of in-
terpreting a provision of his country's code of law; it permits some in-
sight into the methods of finding the law in a civil law system. But in
discussing this subject, we also come to realize how wrong it is to adopt
statutes originating in a foreign legal system even if they come from the
same (civil law) legal tradition. Foreign provisions should not be incor-
porated into one's own legal system - either by legislation or by the
courts - without previous critical examination to determine whether
they will fit into one's own legal system. This applies more particularly if
they are based on a misunderstanding of the history of the law, as in the
case under consideration.
The problem referred to arises out of a provision of the German
Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]) which was enacted in 1896 and
became operative in the year 1900. The Code had developed from the
German legal scholarship of the 19th century, the so-called
"Pandektenwissenschaft." It was during the first two decades of the 20th
* Professor of Law, University of Innsbruck, Austria.
I am grateful to Mag. Karin Weitzenb6ck for valuable help in preparing this article and to Angie
Castille-Ahrens for her valuable assistance in the English translation of this article.
1 At the time when an abridged German text was published in 93 JURISTISCHE BLKTrER [JBL]
441-59 (1971) the reorganization of legal studies in Austria caused heated discussions of whether
any advantages may be derived for modem legal training from obligatory lectures and exams on the
history of law, including Roman law (and especially Canon law). The subject of this article has its
roots in Roman law and may therefore show the usefulness of instruction in the history of law.
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century that this code exercised a strong influence on the interpretation
of the General Civil Code of Austria (Allgemeines Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch
[ABGB]) of the year 1811, on the decisions of the courts and on legal
scholarship.
II. The Basis of the Assignment in the Civil Codes of Austria and
Germany and the Central Issue2
Section 1392 of the Austrian Civil Code provides: "If a claim is
transferred from one person to another and is accepted by the transferee
(assignee), a novation with the intervention of a new creditor arises.
Such a transfer is called an assignment (cession) and it can be made with
or without consideration."-3
This procedure requires no consent on the part of the obligor (ac-
count debtor). Indeed, as long as the assignment is not made known to
the obligor he is authorized to pay the first creditor (the assignor) or to
settle the matter with him in another way (Section 1395 General Civil
Code of Austria).
This form of assignment was unknown to classical Roman law (1st
and 2nd centuries A.D.). 4 The obligatio - the relationship under the law
of obligations, enforceable by an actio in personam - was considered to be
strictly personal. It was a legal bond between two persons which implied
a duty of one towards the other.5
However, the transfer could be managed in another way: the debtor
(obligor) could make a novatory promise (stipulatio) to pay another, new
creditor (the transferee, assignee) the debt he owed to the former credi-
2 A synopsis of the assignment of rights in American law is given by Buxbaum & Crawford,
Wirksamkeitsvoraussetzungen ftir Forderungsabtretungen, insbesondere zu Sicherungszwecken in den Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika in HADDING & SCHNEIDER, DIE FORDERUNGSABTRETUNG, INSBESONDERE ZUR
KREDrrSICHERUNG IN DER BRD UND IN AUSLANDISCHEN RECHTSORDNUNGEN 335-98 (1986). They
point out that under American law the act of assignment is part of the law of contracts and a matter
of state law. Prerequisites for the creation of an assignment are determined by ordinary contract
rules. Consequently the intention of the immediate parties (the intention of the assignor to give and
of the assignee to receive present ownership of the claim; see 3 S. WILLISTON, CoNTRACrs 428 at 162
Jaeger 3d ed. 1960]) is a most important criterion.
3 THE GENERAL CIVIL CODE OF AUSTRIA 271 (J. Winiwarter & P. Baeck trans. 1972) [hereinafter
Baeck].
4 Cf the terse description of this period of legal scholarship given by Hausmaninger, Diligentia
quam in suis, 18 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 183, n.15 (1985):
Classical Roman law, the law of the first two and one-half centuries A. D., was fundamen-
tally jurists' law. Cases were heard by Roman noblemen who had little or no background in
the law. Jurists from the same noble social class advised thejudges. The social and profes-
sional authority of the learned jurists gave their advisory opinions at least de facto force of
law. Judicial decisions were not considered binding precedents and thus were not re-
corded. The legal writings of the jurists, however, were authoritative works. They re-
corded leading and dissenting opinions and provided persuasive arguments for future legal
disputes. There existed no equivalent of the common law doctrine of stare decisis, yet the
jurists had great respect for the authority of older opinions and would not deviate from
them without good reason.
Id.
5 See the following texts from the books of classical Roman jurists in the Digest ofJustinian
(Eng. trans. in P. Scor, THE CIVIL LAW [1932 & reprint in 1973] and in THE DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN
(A. Watson trans. 1985) [hereinafter cited as DIG.]) and in THE INsTITUTEs OF JUSTINIAN (J.A.C.
Thomas Eng. trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as J. INST.]: DIG. 44.7.3 pr. (Paulus); J. INST. 3.13.pr.
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tor (assignor). Still another alternative was the so-called mandatum6 ad
agendum in. rem suam, which is the transfer of the action against the debtor
by the appointment of the transferee as the creditor's representative.
The transferee received a mandate to sue the debtor and to retain the
judgment amount for himself. The details of the merits or demerits of
these methods shall not be discussed in this connection. 7
It was probably not long before the time of the Byzantine (that is,
East Roman) emperor Justinian (527-565 A.D.) that the transferee was
granted an actio utilis against the debtor. Today it is generally believed
that the assignment as practiced underJustinian should be regarded as a
complete transfer of the claim (right). Since the time of the so-called
reception of the Roman Law in Europe - that is, in this connection, the
time during which the commentator's legal scholarship ("Kom-
mentatorenwissenschaft") was propagated in the late 15th century8 - a
great number of theories on the nature and the prerequisites of the as-
signment have appeared. Klaus LUIG9 has given a very clear presenta-
tion of these theories to which one can refer.
With respect to Austria, section 1392 puts a formal end to the devel-
opment of the assignment as a complete transfer of the right. About a
century later virtually the same thing happened in Germany. Section 398
of the German Civil Code reads: "A claim may be transferred by the
creditor to another person by a contract concluded with the latter. Upon
conclusion of the contract, the new creditor takes the place of the former
one."10 This general rule is restricted by section 399, which provides
that "a claim cannot be transferred unless the performance to a person
other than the original creditor may be effected without modification of
the substance of the claim or if such assignment has been precluded by
an agreement with the debtor." The second part of the phrase repre-
sents what is called pactum de non cedendo or contractual prohibition of
assignment. A rule similar to section 399 is found in article 164 of the
Swiss Code of the Law of Obligations (Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht)
dating from the year 1911.11
Under the law of obligations an agreement entered into by creditor
and debtor pursuant to the latter alternative of section 399 of the Ger-
man Code is also effective as against third parties, even if they know
nothing about the agreement. Consequently, if contrary to the agree-
ment, the creditor transfers the claim, the logical result of section 399,
6 Mandate (mandatum) is a consensual contract by which a party assumes the obligation to per-
form a gratuitous service. Cf B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LAw 187 (1962); F.
SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAw 554 (1951 & reprint 1954, 1961, 1969).
7 See NICHOLAS, supra note 6, at 201. See infra text accompanying note 151.
8 See F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZErr 81 (1967); 0. ROBINSON, T. D. FER-
GUS & W. M. GORDON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 100 (1985); GLENDON,
GORDON & OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 46 (1985).
9 ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ZESSIONSLEHRE (1966).
10 For translation, see also THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (I. Forrester, S. Goren & H. Ilgen trans.
1975) [hereinafter Forrester].
11 GMUER, DAs SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILGESETZBUCH 155 (1965) speaks about different and com-
mon rules in Germany and Switzerland, shown by a comparison of the different legal systems. Cf
also E. BUCHER, SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL OHNE DELIKTSRECHT 541
(2d ed. 1988).
1989]
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which provides that "a claim cannot be transferred," would be that the
transferee of the claim cannot sue the debtor. This result is at variance
with the principle upheld so far that obligations are valid only between
the parties concerned and are not effective as against third persons.' 2
Austrian law as well as French law lacks such a rule. But the over-
whelming majority of the decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court (Ober-
ster Gerichtshof)I3 and many scholars 14 borrow from their German
neighbors in assessing the legal effect of the contractual prohibition of
assignment. They consider it correct that the contractual prohibition be
effective vis-i-vis third persons, regardless of the transferee's good faith.
This leads us to the central issue of our complex of problems: Is it
possible for creditors and debtors to create an inalienable claim by virtue
of a pactum or to make a claim inalienable by subsequent agreement to a
pactum? The majority of courts and legal scholars do not hesitate to an-
swer in the affirmative. They argue that there is no good reason for de-
priving the parties of this possible arrangement, since in all other
respects parties may dispose of the claim, maintain or cancel it, either
partially or entirely, as long as they remain within the general limits of
12 An exception is to be found in the Italian Civil Code (Codice Civile) art. 1260, providing that
only the debtor can object to such an agreement vis-i-vis the new creditor, if it is established that the
new creditor (assignee) knew about the agreement at the time of the cession.
13 1O6JBL 311-15 (1984); Evidenzblatt, 36 OSTERREICHISCHEJURISTENZErruNG, no. 111 (1981)
(collection of court decisions, published in the law journal OSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZErrUNG and
cited hereinafter to the year and volume no. of the OJZ as EvBL); 37 EvBL no. 4 (1982), reprinted in
54 Entscheidungen des Osterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [SZ] no. 110 (official
court reporter for the decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court); 106 JBL 675 (1984), reprinted in 30
ZErrSCHRIFT FUR VERKEHRSRECHT [ZVR] 245 (1985); 108 JBL 183 (1986). Unlike its American
namesake, the Austrian Supreme Court does not deal with constitutional issues. It is the court of last
resort for criminal and civil cases (including commercial law matters) and sits in panels of five
judges.
14 2 EHRENZWEIG, SYSTEM DES OSTERREICHISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN PRIVATRECHTS pt. 1: DAS RECHT
DER SCHULDVERHILTNISSE 255 (2d ed. 1928) (especially note 3a); 2 MAYRHOFER, SYSTEM DES OSTER-
REICHISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN PRIVATRECHTS pt. 1: DAS REcr DER SCHULDVERHXLTNISSE 1.
ABTEILUNG: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 478 n.24 (1986) [hereinafter MAYERHOFER, SCHULDRECHT I); Id., Ab-
trelung von Bestandrechten undAbtretungsverbot, 28 OJZ 146-52, 169-73 (1973); GSCHNITZER, LEHRBUCH
DES OSTERREICHISCHEN B.RGERLICHEN RECHrS, SCHULDRECHT: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 100 (1965)
GSCHNrrZER, FAISTENBERGER, BARTA & ECCHER, OSTERREICHISCHES SCHULDRECHT: ALLGEMEINER
TELL 183 (2d ed. 1986); 2 HASEN6HRL, DAS 6STERREICHISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECrrr pt. 1, at 183 (2d
ed. 1899); 2 STUBENRAUCH, COMMENTAR ZUM OSTERREICHISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN BijRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH 805 (8th ed. 1903); 3 KRASNOPOLSKI, LEHRBUCH DES 6STERREICHISCHEN PRIVATREcrrs:
OBLIGATIONENRECHT 268 (1910); Pfersche, Zur Revision des AlIgemeinen Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuches, 44
JURISTISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 176-79 (1912); FROTZ, AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES KREDrr-
SICHERUNGSRECHTES 277 (1970). Gellner's opinion is self contradictory, see Das vertragsmdssige Zession-
sverbot, seine Wirkungen und wirtschaftlichen Funktionen, 31 OSTERREICHISCHES ZENTRALBLATr FOR DIE
JURISTISCHE PRAXIS [ZBL] 1-13 (1913).
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the law.' 5 This argument, when examined more closely, turns out to be a
"petitio princpii. " 16
III. The Historical Development of a Misunderstanding
For the moment this answer marks the end of a long development
resulting from a misunderstanding which dates from antiquity. Though
this misunderstanding has long been recognized as such, its conse-
quences have unfortunately not been given sufficient attention. The
complex of problems I am hinting at may be characterized by the short
phrase: "the claim as an asset."
Better understanding of the development of this problem requires
details. The differentiation between obligatio (obligation) on the one
hand and dominium (real right, ius in re) on the other hand is generally
considered one of the greatest achievements of Roman law. A much-
quoted proof of this differentiation is to be found in the Digest ofJustin-
ian in which Paulus of the late Classical period says that the nature of an
obligation consists in obliging (obstringere) another person to give us
(dare) something to do (facere) or something to be responsible for
(praestare ).17
An achievement less known to non-experts in Roman law but none-
theless remarkable is the fact that, as early as the period of the classical
15 As compensation for the disadvantages which arise from the validation of the pactum de non
cedendo, Frotz is pleading for an analogy to § 916 (2) of the General Civil Code of Austria in Rechisge-
schaflicheAbtretungsverbote (1983) (unpublished paper read to the GrazerJuristic Association); see also
106 JBL 314 (1984) (reference in the Austrian Supreme Court's decision). Section 916, para. 2
reads: "A defense alleging a fictitious declaration cannot be urged against a third person who has
acquired rights in reliance upon such declaration." According to its tenor § 916, para. 2 refers only
to fictitious transactions, but Frotz believes that this rule may be generalized with reference to the
protection of private legal relationships. In analogy to § 916, para. 2 the assignee in good faith
should receive present ownership of a prohibition of assignment if the obligor causes (by negli-
gence) the ostensible existence of an assignable claim. This legal situation would already exist if the
obligor is silent. Since section 1393 of the General Civil Code of Austria states that "All alienable
rights may be assigned" the obligor would have to call the assignee's attention to an existing pactum
de non cedendo stipulated between the debtor and the creditor (would-be assignor). The court cor-
rectly criticized these considerations. 106JBL 314 (1984). Contrary to Frotz's opinion the trans-
feree in modern life has to reckon with the existence of a pactum de non cedendo, because such
agreements are very common. Good faith as to the non-existence of such clauses will hardly exist.
Moreover, an analogy to § 916(2) is doubtful: the basic idea of this rule is the protection of third
persons where the two immediate parties know that their declarations do not correspond with the
real legal situation. But this is not the case with a pactum de non cedendo - and over and above this,
the obligor has no obligation to inform anyone. Finally the silence of the debtor does not constitute
a declaration to the transferee that no pactum exists. Cf Wilhelm, Das Abtretungsverbot in der Ent-
scheidung des verstdrkten Senats, 106 JBL 307 (1984); Iro, OGH: Absolute Wirkung des vertraglichen Ab-
tretungsverbotes, 2 OSTERREICHISCHES RECHT DER WIRTSCHAFT [RDW] 103 (1984). The Supreme
Court's decision of June 12, 1986, 109 JBL 183-85 (1987) is completely wrong. In this case the
debtor payed the assignee without referring to thepactum and without making reservations regarding
future clarification. The debtor's conduct was seen as an implied waiver of his objection to thepactum
not only with respect to debts owed but also with respect to those still accruing. In this way the
external binding effect of the pactum is circumvented by using the legal construction of an implied
declaration. See infra text accompanying note 77.
16 You will find more on the petitio princpii in KLUG, JURISTISCHE LOGIK 153 (3d ed. 1966);
SCHNEIDER, LOGIK FORJURISTEN 255-56 (1972); WEINBERGER, LOGIK, SEMANTIK, HERMENEUTIK 166-
67 (1979).
17 DIG. 44.7.3 pr. (Paulus): Obligationum substantia non in eo consistit, ut aliquod corpus nostrum aut
seruitutem nostram faciat, sed ut alium nobis obstringat ad dandum aliquid velfaciendum vel praestandum.
1989]
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Roman law,' the law of obligations and the law of things were combined
under the common aspect of the law of property. With some skill, this
combination may also be detected in the aforementioned text of the Di-
gest of Justinian.' 9 It is the function of the legal system to see that the
debtor meets his obligations. Consequently, the creditor may trust that
the obligation towards him will actually be fulfilled, not only because he
trusts his debtor but also because he trusts the power of the state, which
urges the debtor to meet his obligation. This "possibility of trust," so it
is argued, constitutes an economic value for the creditor.20
Some may consider this interpretation of the Pauline fragment too
subtle and be unwilling to accept it to such a wide extent. But the Insti-
tutes of Gaius21 offer additional convincing evidence of the combination
of the law of obligations and the law of things.
Although the question of whether Gaius' concept of res, or thing,
and its subdivision have a doctrinal function is controversial, 22 I should
like to point out that the division of things into res corporales and res in-
corporales for the purpose of defining what belongs to a person is defi-
nitely sensible and fruitful. It is even of practical value and does not
merely satisfy a desire for order.
Admittedly, though, Gaius' concept of res has given rise to some ab-
surdities, owing to a combination of heterogeneous things. But this can-
not delude us as to the fact that res incorporales quae iniure consistunt
(incorporeal things, consisting merely in law23 ) 24 such as hereditas (inheri-
tance which was part of the law of property because Gaius regarded
hereditas as an "en bloc" acquisition of corporeal and incorporeal things,
that is, as a succession), ususfructus (usufruct) or obligations however con-
tracted could also be objects of commerce (res in commercio) under classi-
cal Roman law. They could be encumbered with a lien and hereditas could
18 Cf H. Hibner, Eigentumsgarantie und Eigentumsbindung im Grundgesetz und der zivilrechtiche Eigen-
tumsbegriff, 1960 ANNALES UNIVERSrrATIS SARAVIENSIS 92 (Serie Rechts - und Wirtschaftswissen-
schaften No. 8, 1960) (describing the situation in the early Roman period).
19 DIG. 44.7.3 pr.
20 Cf SEIDL, R6MISCHES PRIVATREcHT margin number 263 (1963); Bydlinski in KLANG, 4 KoM-
MENTAR ZUM ALLGEMEINEN BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH pt. 2, 116-17 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter
KLG] which discusses the so-called "Erwerbschance" (the chance for the creditor to get what is owed
to him) as part of every obligation which already belongs to the creditor the moment that the obliga-
tion is created and which must also be taken into consideration by outside persons.
21 Gaius, whose full name and origin remain obscure, was a Roman law teacher without the right
to deliver legal opinions on imperial acts of authority (ius respondendi). Among his works published
between 150-180 A. D. the Institutiones, THE INsTITrrTES OF GArus (F. De Zulueta Eng. trans. 1946,
reprint 1951) [hereinafter G. INST.], which was a systematic textbook of Roman law for beginners,
strongly influenced European legal instruction and civil law codifications. On this Roman jurist see
A. HONORE, GAiUS (1962).
22 Cf Flume, Die Bewertung der Institutionen des Gaius, 79 ZEITSCHRIFTr DER SAVIGNYSTIFrUNG,
ROMAISTiSCE ABTEILUNG [ZSS RoM.] 20-22 (1962); Mayer-Maly, Der Ersitzungsbesitz am
Sachbestandteil, 26 STUDIA ET DOCUMENTA HISTORIAE ET IURIS 176, n.3 (1960) (points out the abilities
of Gaius as a theoretician). For a general view of the discussion see Wieacker, Book Review, 85 ZSS
RoM. 496-501 (1968) (reviewing GAlo NEL Suo TEMPO, Ar DEL SIMposio ROMANISTnCO, BIB-
LIOTECA Di LABEO III [1966]). CASAvoLA, GIURIsTI ADRIANEI 145-58 (1980).
23 G. INST. 2.14.
24 Cf Kagon, 20 TULANE L.R. 98, 378 (1945-46); GROSSO, 1 Studi in ONORE Di E. BESTA 33, 45
(1939).
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be acquired by prescription; a claim could even be sold as is shown by an
example in the Digest ofJustinian (nomen distrahere, selling of a claim).25
But just a short time afterwards underJustinian, this underlying con-
cept of the system of Gaius' Institutes (de personis, de rebus, de actionibus; on
the law of persons, of assets, of actions) was no longer understood cor-
rectly. The authors of the Institutes ofJustinian, in particular the Byzan-
tine professor Theophilus (died around 534 A.D.), the presumed author
of the Paraphrase ofJustinian's Institutes, interpreted the res of the class-
ical jurists in a different way. 26 Theophilus' view, res came merely to de-
note "corporeal thing." The subjective legal relationship, the obligatio,
appeared to be its opposite. Let us take hereditas as an example. Gaius,
regarding it as an acquisition of the inheritance, still included it in the law
of property assets.2 7 With Theophilus, it changed into the considerably
restricted concept of the successor's subjective right.28 Thus, it is with
Theophilus that the comprehensive concept of res began to crumble.
This conception of res, which dates from the time of the Paraphrase
ofJustinian's Institutes, threads its way through German legal history up
to the time of the German Pandektenwissenschaft of the 19th century and
had a decisive influence on the German Civil Code. Though the Glossa-
tors29 were not directly acquainted with the Paraphrase itself, in their
view,30 as in Theophilus' view, obligatio had become the mater actionis
(mother of the claim); that is, the subjective right which could give rise to
legal action, as is shown by the Accursian Glossa Ordinaria (Standard
Gloss).31 Despite the difficulties confronting the Glossators because of
the Institutes ofJustinian,3 2 where obligatio was unambiguously described
as res incorporalis, res was given the new interpretation of ius in re (right in a
thing).
In the following period, the obligatio, formerly regarded as res, was
either considered to be mater actionum and, hence included in the actiones,
or it was considered to be a separate domain.
25 DIG. 18.4.4 (Ulpian): Si nomen sit distractum, Celsus libro nono digestorum scribit locupletem esse
debitorem non debere praestare, debitorem autem esse praestare, nisi aliud convenit. (When a debt is sold, Cel-
sus says in the ninth book of his Digest that subject to contrary agreement, the vendor is not answer-
able for the debtor's solvency but only for the fact that he is the debtor. A. Watson, supra note 5).
26 Cf. AFFOLTER, DAs INSTITUrIONENSYSTEM, SEIN WESEN UND SEINE GESCHicHrE 69-78, 92-95
(1897).
27 G. Inst. 2.97-3.87.
28 J. INST. Paraphrase 2.2., section 1.
29 The Glossators were a school ofjurists in Bologna, Italy, that revived the study of Roman law
towards the end of the 11th and 12th centuries. From there Roman law was spread all over the
world. For a characterization of the Bolognese school of law see P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 56 (1929, reprint 1961).
30 This was their view despite the difficulties of interpreting Justinian's Institutes where "obliga-
ho" is clearly defined as "res incorporalis." J. INST. 2.2.2.
31 Introductio tituli (introduction of the title) "de obligationibus." J. INsT. 3.13. The standard Gloss
of the glossator Accursius (died c. 1263) is a huge compilation of glosses to the whole Corpus iuris
dvilis, the Code of Justinian. The rule that doctrines not recognized by "the Gloss" are not to be
taken into consideration by the judges (quidquid non agnoscit glossa non agnoscit curia; what the Gloss
does not acknowledge the court does not acknowledge either) demonstrates the importance of the
Accursian Gloss.
32 J. INsT. 2.2.2.
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It is to Johannes Apel (1485-1536), a pupil of the late Commenta-
tors,33 but also a spokesman for Humanism in Wittenberg, Germany,
that we owe the final transformation of the antithetical pair "res - obliga-
tio (actio)" into "dominium - obligatio." In his opinion, res, as mentioned
in Gaius' Institutes was an inaccurate name for dominium; and the latter
could not be related to an actio as a contract but only to an obligatio.
Thus, he believed the system of the Institutes should be corrected ac-
cordingly. The relegation of Gaius' commentary book "De rebus" to the
law of property in the restricted sense of the word, that is, the law of
corporeal things, was complete. The originally comprehensive law of
property (law of assets) had been reduced to the law of corporeal
objects. 34
Savigny (1779-1861), the famous exponent of the German Historical
School (Historische Rechtsschule )35 finally found the classical form of Apel's
differentiation. It dominates the entire German Civil Code36 and large
parts of continental legal literature. Savigny defined the nature of a legal
relationship as "a domain of independent rule of the individual will."
With regard to ruling over another person's will, he said:
If the rule were absolute, concepts of liberty and the personality
of the other individual would be rendered void; we would no longer
rule a person but rather a thing, our right would be the title to a
human being, as was in fact the Roman relationship between master
and slave. To avoid this, we should conceptualize a special legal rela-
tionship which consists in the rule over another person without the
destruction of his liberty so as to resemble property and, in contrast to
[a property relationship], this rule does not relate to the other person
in his entirety but only to a single action of the latter; this action will
then be considered to be excluded from the acting person's freedom
and to be subjected to our will. This relationship of rule over some
actions of the other person is called obligation.37
This theoretical argument completes the separation of the law of
corporeal things from the law of obligations. Savigny chose a voluntary
conception of the contract,38 meaning the conception of a claim which is
definitely confined to the intersubjective relationship between creditor
33 The Commentators' period followed the Glossators' and was characterized by the subject-
matter of the jurists work. While the Glossator's subject was mainly Roman law as manifested by
Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis, the Commentators worked on all law of their time, especially on the
statutes of the upper Italian communities and the feudal law of the Langobards. See 0. ROBINSON, T.
FERGUS & W. GORDON, supra note 8, at 100.
34 Cf. I STINTZING-LANDSBERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN REcrrSWISSENSCHAFr 290-96
(1880).
35 For a short characterization of this school, see VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 61 (2d ed. 1977).
36 Cf WIFACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHIC=rE DER NEuzErr 520-21 (2d ed. 1967), with further
references.
37 1 SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R6MISCHEN REcHTS 334, 338 (1840); WIEACKER, ZUM SYSTEM DES
DEUTSCHEN VERM6GENSRECHTES 29, 32 (1941).
38 For other reasons for a valid contract, see Mayer-Maly, Studien zum Vertrag II: Von solehen Hand-
lungen, die den Kontrakten in ihrer Wirkung gleichkommen, FESTSCHRIFT WILBURG 135-36 (1965); BYDLIN-
SKI, PRIVATAUTONOMIE UND OBJEKTIVE GRUNDLAGEN DES VERPFLICHTENDEN RECHTSGESCHXFTEs 62-70
(1967); KREVET, DAS VERTRAGSRECHT IN DER MrrrELDEUTSCHEN INDUSTRIE (1965); DIE VERTRAGS-
BEZIEHUNGEN DER LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHEN PRODUKTIONSGENOSSENSCHAFTEN (Greiner ed. 1967);
Hinn, Verstindnis und Interpretation des Vertragsrechtes im Lichte eines beweglichen Systems, DAS BEWEGLICHE
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and debtor. These conceptions dominate the Motives (Motive) of the
German Civil Code as well as the Code itself. The idea was that a claim
has an external aspect, that is, its function' as a person's asset.3 9 This
aspect exists apart from the internal aspect of the claim as conceived of in
the classical Roman tradition; that is, the intersubjective relationship be-
tween creditor and debtor resulting in the creditor's being entitled to
demand a certain person's actions or omissions. This idea was often for-
gotten in subsequent legislation and was already harshly criticized when
the German Civil Code was drafted.40 But this criticism remained un-
heeded, and the concept of res was not changed (the legal definition of res
as a corporeal thing as found in section 90 of the German Civil Code was
maintained),41 nor was the substance of the obligation contained in sec-
tion 241 based on Savigny's voluntaristic conception ("An obligation en-
titles the creditor to claim performance from the debtor. The
performance may consist in a forbearance." 42). It must, however, be
mentioned that this "substance of the obligation" was not stated consist-
ently throughout the Code. For example, the recognition of the transfer
of a right to a claim constitutes a violation of the doctrine which states
that the nature of an obligation corresponds exclusively to a personal
relationship between creditor and debtor.43
The decisive influence of the intellectual atmosphere in which a code
comes into being may be illustrated by a comparison with the Austrian
Civil Code. The Austrian Code was greatly influenced by the era of en-
lightened natural law and its proponents. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), 44
succeeded by Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), 45 and finally Christian Wolff
(1679-1754),46 developed (without knowledge of the system of the Gaius
Institutes) 47 a special system of private law based on the consideration of
human nature.48 In this system, or more particularly in the doctrine of
property acquisition, the law of corporeal things and the law of obliga-
tions, both governing the exchange of property, are united by the aspect
of the law of property (of assets). Christian Wolff's teachings made an
SYSTEM IM GELTENDEN UND K0NFTIGEN RECHT 87-102 (Bydlinski, Krejci, Schilcher & Steininger ed.,
Forschungen aus Staat und Recht No. 73, 1986).
39 Cf. 1 SOKOLOWSKI, DIE PHILOSOPHIE IM PRIVATRECHT 400-04 (1907, reprint 1959); Dnistrjan-
skyi, Dingliche undpersbnliche Rechte, 78JHERINGSJAHRBCJCHER FOR DIE DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN ROMI-
SCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS [JHERINGS JB]. 105-07 (1927-28).
40 VON GIERKE, DER ENTWURF EINES BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES UND DAS DEUTSCHE RECHT
43-47 (1889); MENGER, DAS BURGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN 37 (3d ed.
1904); Kuntschke, Zur Kritik Otto von Gierkes am Birgerlichen Gesetzbuch in CSIZMADIA & KovAcs, DIE
ENTWICKLUNG DES ZIVILRECHTS IN MITTELEUROPA 1848-1944, at 153-57, 163 (1970).
41 Section 90 reads: Only corporeal objects are things in the legal sense. (I. Forrester, supra note
10, at 14).
42 Vo N MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 35, at 1190.
43 Cf. VON GIERKE, supra note 40, at 203.
44 GROTIUS, DE IURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES II 2 § 1ff. (1625); Cf. WIEACKER, supra note 36, at
291.
45 PUFENDORF, DE IURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI VIII (1672); cf. WiEACKER, supra note 36, at
307, 310.
46 WIEACKER, supra note 36, at 332-33; WUNNER, CHRISTIAN WOLFF UND DIE EPOCHE DES NATUR-
RECHTS 15, 29-31 (1968).
47 Niebuhr discovered the Institutes of Gaius in 1816 on a palimpsest in Verona, Italy.
48 Cf. BEYERLE, DER ANDERE ZUGANG ZUM NATURRECHT, DEUTSCHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 3
(1939) (concerning the older system of natural law); WIEACKER, supra note 37, at 10.
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imprint on the Prussian Code ("Aligemeines Landrecht") of 1794.4 9 They
influenced his pupils as well as Freiherr von Martini and Franz Edler von
Zeiller, two fathers of the Austrian Civil Code and teachers of natural
law, and finally the General Civil Code of Austria.50 The system of this
code largely relies upon the Institutes of Gaius. A short introduction
entitled "The Civil Laws in General" is followed by the first part entitled
"On the Law of Persons," and then a second part, "On the Law of Prop-
erty." Due to the comprehensiveness of the res (thing) as conceived of in
the General Civil Code of Austria, the second part also includes incorpo-
real things (section 285): "All that differs from a person and serves the
use of men shall be called thing in the legal sense." Therefore, this sec-
ond part includes a discussion of the law of corporeal things, followed by
the provisions of the law of succession and, under the heading "Reflec-
tions on Personal Rights in Property," the law of obligations. A third
and final part is entitled "Reflections on Rules Common to the Law of
Persons and the Law of Property." 5 1
Thus, the development originating in Roman Law and continuing in
the system of the German Civil Code is a continuous one, but, as illus-
trated by the Austrian Civil Code, by no means a necessary one.
IV. Conclusions for this Special Problem in General
What conclusions may be drawn from these general considerations
with regard to the special problems of the pactum de non cedendo?
Let us first of all answer the question raised earlier in this Article:
Are the parties concerned allowed to define arbitrarily the substance of
any claim? And, as a consequence, are they allowed to establish a claim
as unassignable from the outset?52
From the viewpoint of Theophilus' concept of claims as altered dur-
ing the era of the German Pandektenwissenschaft 53 under Savigny's influ-
ence, the answer could be: yes. However, we have seen that this concept
of the claim is one-sided because it relates exclusively to the intersubjec-
tive relationship between creditor and debtor and neglects the property
aspect of the claim. Since there is a chance for the creditor to get what is
owed to him, the claim does after all form part of his property and may
under certain circumstances be "commercialized" like a corporeal thing
49 HATrENHAUER, ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FUR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794:
EINFOHRUNG 17 (1970).
50 Ebert, Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft. Ein Beitragzur Zeit des spdten Naturrechts in Osterreich, 85
ZEITscHRiFr DER SAVIGNY STIFrUNG, GERMANISTISCHE ABTEiLUNG 108, n.18, 111-13 (1968); Mock,
Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtsphilosophen an der Wiener Juristischen Fakultdt, 20 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR 6FFENT-
LICHES RECHT 373-99 (1970).
51 In Austria, civil procedure (de actionibus), the third part of Gaius' Institutes, is set forth in
separate codes and does not form part of the substantive law.
52 This question does not arise with strictly personal rights. For example ifA agreed to paint B's
portrait for a fee, B's right could not be assigned to C at all.
53 Cf. (concerning the system of the "Pandekten") Schwarz, Zur Entstehung des modernen Pandekten-
systems, 42 ZSS ROM. 578-610 (1921). For the doctrinal argument on which the system is based see
CANARIS, SYSTEMDENKEN UND SYSTEMBEGRIFF IN DER JURISPRUDENZ ENTWICKELT AM BEISPIEL DES
DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS (2d ed. 1983), Wieacker, Book Review, 1 REcrrsTHEORIE-ZEITSCHRIFr
FUR LOGIK, METHODENLEHRE, KYBERNETIK UND SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1970, reviewing CANARIS,
1st ed.) and F. BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE UND RECHTSBEGRIFF 442 (1982).
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and became a res in commercio. The pactum does not change the substance
of the claim, as is often argued, but rather, the substance of the actual
obligatory relationship. If we wanted to maintain the thesis that the sub-
stance of a claim may be modified by an agreement between the parties
concerned, we would commit the methodical error of a petitio principii, of
a circulus in probando, which is contrary to the laws of logic. 5 4 The only
way to answer the question of the transferability of a claim is to examine
the substance of the claim. However, in arguing that the pactum has
made the claim untransferable in substance, I cannot anticipate what re-
mains to be proved. This is exactly what we are trying to find out by
examining the substance of the claim.
The legal value of the pactum de non cedendo follows from the Janus-
faced character of a claim. Only if we admit that the claim may be an
asset can it be the object of legal and commercial transactions and not
require the approval of the primary obligor (the debtor). It may be a res
in commercio; only then is the modern assignment conceivable. 55 From a
legal point of view, the pactum cannot be regarded as being anything
other than a pactum de non alienando, a contractual restraint on alienation
relating to a corporeal thing.56 It is a bilateral contract pursuant to which
the creditor of a claim promises the debtor not to dispose of the claim by
way of assignment. Upon acceptance of this promise, the contract be-
comes perfected.5 7
V. The Law in Germany
What has been said about the legal nature of the contractual prohibi-
tion of assignment holds true both for Germany and Austria. But the two
systems differ as to the legal consequences resulting from a breach of this
contract. More precisely, they differ as to whether the assignee may legit-
imately acquire a claim against the debtor (obligor) in spite of a pactum if
the claim is ceded by the creditor. Section 399, second alternative, of the
German Civil Code furnishes the basis for the obligation between credi-
54 See supra note 16.
55 TOLKMrrr, DIE THEORIE DER NOVATION IM GEMEINEN RECHT DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS, (1968)
(Thesis) (reviewed by Wieacker in 9JURISTENJAHRBUCH 19 (1968-69)), proved that even in the time
of the ':Pandektenwissenschaft" the construction of a novatory promise of the debtor to pay a new
creditor was used to a great extent. The concept of the character of the claim in the German Civil
Code is also demonstrated by the integration of the assignment into the law of obligations instead of
it being classified as a disposal of the claim by virtue of the claim's function as an asset. This mistake
is caused by the concept of the novatory promise (that is the idea of changing only the contractual
relationship between creditor and debtor) without logically requiring the debtor's participation in
the act of transfer.
56 The analogous structure of the pactum de non cedendo and the pactum de non alienando was already
recognized by Seuffert, Wfirkung vertragsniissiger Cessionsverbote, 51 ARCHIV F0R DIE CIVILISTISCHE
PRAXIS [ACP] 106-07, 109 (1868). Cf. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1834, Oberlandesgericht Lilbeck, (Lii-
beck Appeal Court), W. Ger., 5 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 16 (1852); 36 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 412 (1881); 27
Sammiung der zivilgerichtlichen Entscheidungen des Reichgerichts (Decisions of the Supreme
Court of the German Reich in Civil Matters) 341, pursuant to CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.], art. 537, 544,
1689-90 (Fr.) (concerning French law). But this opinion was not accepted. Cf. Stegemann, Daspac-
turn de non cedendo, 67 ACP 318 (1884); Eck, Gemeines (r~misches) Recht, Besprechung reichsgerichtlicher
Entscheidungen, 35JHERINGSJB 304 (1896); 39 SEUFFERTS ARCHlV 146 (1884).
57 This view of the contractual prohibition of assignment recommends itself when the pactum is
not contracted for at the same time the original obligation is created but, rather, afterwards; see supra
note 15, at 103 (critical commentary to the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court by Iro).
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tor and debtor, effective as against third parties.58 The transferee of the
claim cannot sue the debtor. Considering the basic concept of the char-
acter of an obligation (although the concept of "a legal bond between
two persons only" is doubtful and has been completely undermined5 9 ),
these consequences seem to be anomalous. This anomaly is all the more
amazing since the result of section 399, second alternative, of the Ger-
man Civil Code conflicts with section 137, first sentence, of the Code.60
This rule specifies that the power (right) to dispose freely of an alienable
claim must not be excluded or limited by legal transaction. Thus I agree
with some scholars in Germany who view section 399, second alternative,
as a lexspecialis to section 137, first sentence (lexgeneralis).6 1 The collision
between those rules is easily remedied by the principle "lex specialis derogat
legi generali."6 2
A second group of scholars63 does not consider section 137, first
sentence, and section 399, second alternative, as being in opposition to
one another. In their view, section 137, first sentence, cannot preclude
the power of disposition; but section 399, second alternative, should give
creditors and debtors the possibility of creating an inalienable claim.
Therefore, they argue that section 137, first sentence, should have noth-
ing to do with the problematic nature of a pactum de non cedendo since this
rule speaks of an alienable right (claim). But, according to section 399,
second alternative, no alienable right exists at all. I have already dealt
58 Section 399 of the German Civil Code reads: "A claim is not assignable if the performance
cannot be effected in favor of any person other than the original creditor without alteration of its
substance, or if assignment is excluded by agreement with the debtor." Forrester, supra note 10.
59 Cf KOZIOL, DIE BEEINTRXCHTIGUNG FREMDER FORDERUNGSRECHTE (1967); REHBEIN, DIE
VERLETZUNG VON FORDERUNGSRECHTEN DURCH DRrrrE (1968) (Thesis); L6wiscH, DER DELIKTSS-
CHUTZ RELATIVER RECHTE (1970); 2 KOZIOL, OSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT 85-90 (2d ed.
1984); MAYRHOFER, SCHULDRECHT I, supra note 14, at 4-8; Grillberger, Zur Einziehung fremder
Forderungen im eigenen Namen, 33 OJZ 142 (1978); Bydlinski in KLANG, supra note 20, at 116; Missb-
rdiuchliche Veriigungen ziber Bankkonten und Verwendungsansprfche des Kontoberechtigten, 16 QUARTALSHEFrE
DER GIROZENTRALE [QUARTHGZ] 5-6 (1981). Bydlinski, Die Anfechtungs- und Aufrechnungsrechte des Zes-
sionschuldners, 36 OJZ 456 (1981).
60 BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENREcHTs 32, 87 (14th ed. 1987). Section 137 of the German Civil
Code, first sentence, reads: "The power to dispose of an alienable right may not be excluded or
limited by legal transaction." Forrester, supra note 10.
61 I will not discuss different considerations among this group of scholars concerning whether
section 137, first sentence, governs the transferability of a claim (Schmidt, SOERGEL-SIEBERT,
BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 399, margin number 4 [1 lth ed. 1978-83]); 1 PLANCK, KOMMENTAR
ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 137, note b (1978-83); Westermann, I ERMANN, HANDKOM-
MENTAR ZUM BfORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 137 margin number 3 (7th ed. 1981) or states a rule
concerning the power of disposition over a claim (I think the latter approach is correct). See also
LEONHARD, ALLGEMEINES SCHULDRECHT DES BRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 659 (1929); 1 ESSER-
SCHMIDT, SCHULDRECHT I: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 604-05 (6th ed. 1984); MEDICUS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL
DES BGB 242 (3d ed. 1986); Diubler, Rechtsgeschiftlicher Ausschluss der Verdiusserlichkeit von Rechten?, 21
NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr [NJW] 1120 (1968). However, I doubt that an interpretation of
the party's intention should answer this question. See RAIBLE, VERTRAGLICHE BESCHR.NKUNG DER
UBERTRAGUNG VON RECHTEN 72 (1969).
62 E. BErn, ALLGEMEINE AUSLEGUNGSLEHRE ALS METHODIK DER GEISTESWISSENSCHAFrEN 638
(1967) (examines the problematic nature of this principle).
63 Hefermehl, SOERGEL-SIEBERT, supra note 61, at 137, margin number 2b; Werner in STAU-
DINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 399, margin number 2 (12th ed. 1980-
1984); BLAUM, DAS ABTRETUNGSVERBOT NACH PARAGRAPH 399 2. ALTERNATIVE BGB UND SEINE Aus-
WIRKUNGEN AUF DEN RECHTSVERKEHR 1-40 (1983) [hereinafter BLAUM, ABTRETUNCSVERBOT].
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with the theory that the parties can create an inalienable claim by con-
tract or may transform it afterwards into an inalienable one.
In view of the validity of the pactum de non cedendo even for third par-
ties the German Civil Code (Section 399, second alternative) pays insuffi-
cient attention to the commercial function of a claim.64 The fact that
legal scholars have frequently attempted to validate an impermissible
and therefore invalid assignment on condition that the debtor whose
claim has been transferred give his ratihabitio demonstrates this defect in
the Code. More subtle doctrinal constructions which would accomplish
this same end are also to be found. 65 This must be a result of the consid-
eration that there is no reason why the assignee should not be able to sue
the primary obligor, if the latter consents to it. But this result calls for
acceptable theoretical underpinnings to achieve the desired end, since
the pactum was only devised to protect the debtor's interests.
The following sentences may well be founded on these or similar
ideas: "The debtor's subsequent consent to the assignment makes an
effective assignment out of an ineffective one" 66 or "the one-sided con-
sent of the debtor cures the defect of an invalid assignment." 67 The au-
thors weigh the consequences of these theories more or less seriously
according to their respect for the written law. But the rules of the Ger-
man Civil Code which are used, to obtain the desired result cannot in
reality furnish reasons for this result.
Two attempts to resolve this dilemma are to be found in German
legal literature: Some scholars try to solve the problem with the help of
section 135 of the Civil Code, 68 others use sections 185, paragraph 2,
and 184, paragraph 1, of the Code.69
Let us examine the first group of opinions. In applying the rule of
section 135 to a pactum de non cedendo, one has to consider that legal re-
64 Yet the first draft of the German Civil Code in 1888 expressly specified that the pactum is only
effective as between the two immediate parties. See 2 MoTivE ZUM BiORGERLICHEN GESrZBUCH,
RECHT DER SCHULDVERHALTNISSE, 121-23 (1888). In the second reading this part of the section was
deleted. Draftsmen argued that there were neither good reasons nor commercial interests which
justified precluding the type ofpactum which is valid vis-a-vis third parties. 1 PROTOKOLLE ZU DEM
ENTWURFE DES BURGERLICHEN GESETEBUCHES 384 (1897-99), reprinted in 2 MUGDAN, DIE GESAMMTEN
MATERIALIEN ZUM BGB 573 (1899). Thus established facts were misjudged.
65 On the problem of "useful constructions," tricks, and hidden ways for applying the law, see
Scheuerle, Finale Subsumtionen, 167 ACP 305 (1967).
66 1 LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS 582 (14th ed. 1987). See supra note 15 and infra note
77 for more on problems connected with implied consent.
67 Es ER-SCHMIDT, supra note 61, at 605. BLAuM, supra note 62, at 138, 145 demands a contract,
because consent is not only required when the parties contract for a pactun, but also when they want
to cancel it. He also agrees with the aforementioned idea of the unilateral ratihabitio, which he calls
an improper doctrinal construction.
68 Section 135, para. 1 of the German Civil Code reads: "If the disposition ofan object violates
a statutory prohibition against alienation which aims only at the protection of particular persons, the
disposition is without effect only as it regards to (sic) these persons. A contractual disposition is
equivalent to a disposition which is effected by means of compulsory execution or attachment."
Forrester, supra note 10.
69 Section 185, para. 2: "The disposition is valid if the person entitled ratifies it, or if the dis-
poser acquires the object, or if the person entitled has succeeded to his estate and is liable without
limitation for the obligations of the estate. In the last two cases, if several incompatible dispositions
have been made affecting the object, only the first disposition is effective." Section 184 para. 1:
"Subsequent assent (ratification) operates from the moment when the legal transaction was entered
into, unless otherwise provided." Forrester, supra note 10.
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straints on alienation are exceptional provisions; 70 they prohibit sales
transactions which are normally allowed under general legal principles.
Thus, one must agree with Nipperdey7' in saying that a prohibition of
alienation cannot be characterized as a legal one if general rules already
declare the alienation null and void. Neither the fact that the alienator is
incompetent nor that in the case of a pactum de non cedendo one right is
connected with another one which limits the former one means that a
restraint on alienation is a legal one.72 In addition to these considera-
tions which argue against applying section 135 of the Code to our spe-
cific problem, I do not see why a contractual pactum de non cedendo should
be a question of a legal prohibition of alienation. Clearly, we must distin-
guish between legal, judicial and official restraints on alienation on the
one hand, and contractual restraints on the other hand.73
But even the second attempt at solving this problem cannot satisfac-
torily explain how the debtor's unilateral consent should retroactively
change an ineffective assignment into an effective one. First of all, there
are methodological objections to the application of section 185 para-
graph 2 and section 184 paragraph 1. Located at the beginning of the
sixth title of the German Civil Code concerning approval and ratification,
section 182 specifies in its first part: "If the validity of a contract or of a
unilateral transaction.., depends upon the consent of a third party .... "
Now, the effectiveness of an assignment is independent of the debtor's
consent. If there is no pactum de non cedendo, the assignment is valid with-
out his consent. On the other hand, if there is a prohibition on assign-
ment the clear wording of section 399 (... . "is not assignable...") is an
obstacle to the transfer. Section 399 very clearly answers whether an as-
signment can be effective, regardless of whether or not the parties have
agreed to a pactum de non cedendo: no, it cannot. Section 399 does not
discuss effectiveness at all. But the rules of section 182 and the sections
which follow are only applicable if the effectiveness of a contract comes
into question. If one must examine the legal qualification of the debtor's
consent, then an invalid assignment cannot simultaneously be changed
into an assignment dependent upon the debtor's consent. When jurists
apply sections 185 and 184 they commit the error of a petitio principii. 74
If a pactum de non cedendo has been agreed upon, there is only one
("doctrinally satisfactory") way for the assignee to step into the creditor's
70 2 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS 886-87 (15th ed.
1960).
71 Id. at 887 n.5.
72 BLAUM, ABTRETUNGSVERBOT, supra note 63, at 88, also objects to the view that section 135
should be applicable. Section 135 governs alienable claims. In the case of a pactum de non cedendo
they no longer exist. See also Zeiss, Wirksamkeitsvoraussetzungen fir Ford'ungsabtretungen, insbesondere zu
Sicherungszwechen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, FORDERUNGSABTRETUNG INSBESONDERE ZUR KREDIT-
SICHERUNG IN DER BRD UND IN AUSLANDISCHEN RECHTSORDNUNGEN 49, 56-57 (Hadding-Schneider
ed. 1986; German High Court ofJustice (Bundesgerichtshof, hereinafter BGH), 43 JURIMSsCHE RUND-
SCHAU 239, 240 (1978). But Blaum does not believe in an analogy to section 135: The interest of
the assignor in making an assignment is not as important as the interest of the primary obligor in
knowing about the creditor (the assignee) whom he must pay. Therefore, no assignment is possible.
73 ENNECCERUs-NIPPERDEY, supra note 70, at 886.
74 Cf Zeiss, supra note 72, at 56.
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shoes: he can make a contract to modify the substance of the pactum (ac-
cording to section 305). 7 5
The claim may then be legally transferred. I admit that this solution
looks like a superfluous construction if the debtor for whose protection
the pactum was concluded consents to the (previous and invalid) assign-
ment. Yet, it helps to clarify what happened: An assignable right was
connected with a pactum, and has been assigned contrary to the terms of
the pactum. In this case section 399 states that the assignee did not ac-
quire the primary creditor's right. This result does not change even if
the debtor subsequently consents to the assignment, since under section
399 no assignment was possible. If someone rejects artificial construc-
tions like this one for explaining or solving legal problems76 and prefers
to focus more on the parties' interests (as expressed in legal provisions),
one must opt for the solution of the problem reached through the subse-
quent consent of the debtor. However, both solutions - the construc-
tion of the new contract and the unilateral consent - leave the problem
arising from the rule of section 399, second alternative. 77 Of course the
debtor need not expressly make this declaration of intention. An implied
declaration will also suffice. But the question remains of whether the ac-
ceptance of an implied declaration will be appropriate not just for solv-
ing theoretical difficulties. Another problem is that the debtor often has
no intention of making a declaration and the legal institution of an im-
plied contract or declaration is frequently used in an impermissible
manner.
78
As has been demonstrated, this result is a consequence of an errone-
ous conception of the legal obligation. I agree with Blaum 79 that this
result creates a serious situation of conflict. Indeed, the free circulation
of assets is sufficiently protected by the laws on executions and foreclo-
sures if the property of the adjudged debtor is taken in fulfillment of the
claim, since a stipulated pactum de non cedendo does not prevent the en-
forcement of a conventional lien, for example.80 But, the field of private
commerce is entirely lacking in protection: the debtor's individual inter-
ests are overrated in comparison with the interests of general commerce.
However, I disagree with Blaum when he says that a new statute ad-
dressed to the problem of the pactum de non cedendo which would preclude
its binding effect on third parties can offer no satisfactory solution. His
75 Section 305 of the German Civil Code states: "For the creation of an obligation by legal
transaction, and for modification of the substance of an obligation, a contract between the parties is
necessary, unless otherwise provided by law." Forrester, supra note 10.
76 For a legitimate use of constructions see Wieacker, Diejuristische Sekunde. Zur Legitimation der
Konstruktionsjurisprudenz, ExisTENz UND ORDNUNG - FEsTsCHRIFr ERIK WOLF 421-53 (1962).
77 In this sense a decision of the German High Court ofJustice published in 38 WERTPAPIERMrr-
TEILUNGEN 1404-06 (1984) held that an ineffective assignment under apactum de non cedendo can only
be remedied by a contract between creditor and debtor (in addition to this, a confirmation of assign-
ment is necessary).
78 For the difficulties with implied contracts in the case law of the Austrian Supreme Court, see
F. BYDLINSKI, supra note 38, at 12; id., Die Grundlagen des Vertretungsrechts im Meinungsstreit, 29 BASLER
JURISTISCHE MrrrEILUNGEN 14 (1982); and in connection with this subject, see supra note 15.
79 BLAUM ABTRETUNGSUERBOT, supra note 63, at 35-70.
80 GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 851, para. 2.
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suggestion of "adjusting the judicial decisions" 8' to the pactum de non
cedendo (according to section 399) is extremely problematic. The guide-
lines for this adjustment should be the general clauses of the Code like
"loyalty and good-faith" (section 242) or "public morality" (section 138).
I doubt if these clauses can provide enough legal certainty for the de-
mands of commercial life.
The suggestion of Zeiss8 2 is very surprising. For him the pactum de
non cedendo (even with validity for third parties) is no binding contract.
His only argument is: One can easily circumvent a stipulated pactum.
This should be no argument, at least no argument which is in accordance
with recognized legal methods. But one may also find more hidden paths
in Blaum's book.83 But such "tricks" are not confined just to legal doc-
trine. Even the decisions of the German High Court of Justice for Civil
Matters contain such "permissible tricks."8 4
All in all, it is not surprising to find increasingly the demand in Ger-
many for legal steps which would deprive a pactum de non cedendo of valid-
ity with respect to third partles.85
VI. The Law in Austria
With regard to the Austrian legal system, which contains no provi-
sion corresponding to section 399 of the German Civil Code, a satisfac-
tory resolution of this issue may be found in existing written law upon
consideration of all decisive circumstances. Section 364c of the General
Civil Code of Austria contains a rule that may be applied to thepactum de
non cedendo directly or at least by analogy. Section 364c states: "A con-
tractual or testamentary prohibition to sell or encumber a thing or a real
right shall only bind the first owner but shall not bind his heirs and other
successors in interest. It shall be valid with respect to third persons if it
has been agreed upon between husband and wife, parents and children,
adopted or foster children or their husbands and wives, and if it has been
entered into the official record."8 6 However, modern legal doctrine,
marked by the influence of the German Civil Code,8 7 rejects the inclusion
of the pactum de non cedendo within this rule. Some scholars argue that an
obligation is not a thing and that it would be incorrect to interpret the
word "thing" in section 364c of the Austrian Code as res in the broad
sense of the legal definition. They argue that the combination of the
words "thing" and "real thing" (ius in re) clearly shows the meaning of
"thing" in section 364c as a corporeal thing, and an obligation is cer-
tainly not a corporeal thing.88
81 BLAUM ABTRETUNGSUERBOT, supra note 63, at 297, 298.
82 Zeiss, supra note 72, at 56.
83 BLAUM ABTRETUNGSUERBOT, supra note 63, at 210-24.
84 See, e.g., 29 MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES REcHT 935 (1975).
85 Cf Claus Ott, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB ("Alternativkommentar") § 399, margin number 2 (Wasser-
mann ed. 1980) with further references.
86 Baeck, supra note 3, at 67.
87 Section 364c was introduced in 1916 by an amendment which was heavily influenced by the
German Civil Code of 1900.
88 Wolff, 6 KLANr, supra note.20, at 295 (2d ed. 1951); agreeing with this opinion: GSCHNrrzER,
FAISTENBERGER, BARTA & CALL, OSTERREICHISCHES SACHENRECHT 156-57 (2d ed. 1985).
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This argument is not convincing. On the contrary, it is an example
of"Begzffsjurisprudenz," which takes into consideration neither the legisla-
ture's objective interests nor the basic values of a law. Other scholars8 9
refer to the "Herrenhausbericht" (HHB).90 It primarily shows the legisla-
tive intent. On the one hand, the legislature wanted to promote free
legal relationships in private commerce by limiting to a certain time pe-
riod the validity of every obligation, including personal ones created by a
stipulated pactum de non alienando (restraint on alienation; contractual pro-
hibition of sale and encumbrance). On the other hand, it wanted to ap-
prove this pactum with validity for third persons if legal interests were to
require that the possessions of the entitled party under the pactum
needed protection. 91 The pactum's effect of securing a real right could
only be established, if the public were notified of this pactum, because
good faith of a third party can only be destroyed if it is theoretically pos-
sible to know about this pactum. But in the opinion of the Herrenhaus
commission, it is impossible to give notice of the pactum when movable
property is concerned. 92 With regard to restraints on assignments, the
Herrenhaus report states that the "nature of the relationship" 93 de-
mands the binding effect of the pactum with respect to the assignee, so to
speak demands that the debtor may oppose the assignment in a pactum.
These records are typically based on the model of the prevailing legal
opinion in Germany at the time of the newly implemented Civil Code.
This assumption is confirmed by the following sentence: "Section 399 of
the German Civil Code also makes this choice." I have already spoken of
the problematic nature of the uncritical adoption of German law.94
Otte95 has shown the danger of arguments based upon "the nature of a
subject matter."' 96 With this method ("Wesensschau")97 an author often
seeks to veil evidentiary weaknesses or to save himself the trouble of
making a detailed argument98 which can be verified in a rational manner.
89 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 14, at 255 n.4, 167 n.24.
90 78 PROTOKOLLE DES HERRENHAUSES, 21st Sess. 164-66, reprinted in HERRENHAUSKOMMISSIONS-
BERICHT [HHB] 42-44 (1912). The Herenhaus was the first division of the Austrian Reichsrat, the
competent authority for legislation (1861-1918). The second division was called the Abge-
ordnetenhaus. The minutes of the Herrenhaus concerning this amending law are called Herrenhaus -
(kommissions) berichte (HHB).
91 lId at 165, reprinted in HHB 43.
92 Id at 166, reprinted in HHB 44.
93 That seems to be the relationship between creditor and debtor.
94 Cf supra Introduction.
95 Otte, Wesen, Verkehrsanschauung, wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise - ein Problem der Paragraphe 93,
119 II, 459, 950 BGB, 10JuRISTISCHE SCHULUNG 154 (1970); Mayer-Maly, Romanistisches iiber die
Stellung der Natur der Sache zwischen Sein und Sollen, 2 STUDI VOLTERRA 113-124 (1971).
96 The reliance on the nature of a subject matter and on structures coordinated according to
subject remains correct, if seen according to Wieacker's view, supra note 76, as a "Art der Geltung von
Sachbezzfgen des tdglichen Lebens" (a kind of validity of structures, coordinated as subjects of every day
life).
97 Cf, e.g., REINACH, ZUR PHANOMENOLOGIE DES RECHTS (2d ed. 1953), an unmodified reprint of
his work DIE APRIORISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DES BURGERLICHEN RECTS (1913); AMSELEK, METHODE
PHENOMENOLOGIqUE ET THEORIE DU DRorr (1964); LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHA~r 108-15, 401-04 (5th ed. 1983); WIEACKER, supra note 36, at 426 n.37, 591, 613.
98 For the importance of arguments in decisions, see DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGSBEGRONDUNG IN
EUROPAISCHEN VERFAHRENSRECHTEN UND IM VERFAHREN VOR INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTEN (Sprung &
Kbnig ed. 1974).
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However, there are still many arguments in favor of treating a contrac-
tual prohibition of cession like the model of a restraint on alienation or
an encumbrance of a corporeal thing as provided for in section 364c of
the Austrian Civil Code.
As a first argument, I should like to point out that, in order to pro-
tect private legal relationships, section 364c of the General Civil Code of
Austria should cover all the assets 99 of a person which may be qualified as
res in commercio. Since, according to the general opinion held today,
claims are to be regarded as assets, it follows that section 364c should be
applied to contractual prohibitions on cession.
There is another argument in favor of treating the contractual prohi-
bition of sale and encumbrance (pactum de non alienando) like the contrac-
tual prohibition of assignment. As far as the transferor's liability is
concerned, the General Civil Code of Austria classifies the assignment as
a sale of a corporeal thing. A person who transfers a claim gratuitously is
no longer held liable for it. However, if the assignment is made for con-
sideration, the assignor is responsible to the assignee both for the verity
and the recoverability of the claim. 00 Another argument justifies includ-
ing the pactum de non cedendo within the purview of section 364c. When
property is sold or acquired, titulus (title, that is, economic basis for the
acquisition) and modus acquirendi 101 (mode of acquisition) are required
under Austrian law' 0 2 (unlike German law where acquisition of owner-
ship is provided without economic basis, it is "abstract" by law).' 0 3 Since
the problems with the pactum revolve more or less around the sale and
acquisition of property in the broadest sense of the word, titles to prop-
erty (iura in re) and titles to claims (obligationes) should be treated the
same, in the absence of contrary rules of law. Both the pactum de non
alienando and the pactum de non cedendo constitute a contractual restraint
on acquisition. There are no corresponding special rules applicable to
claims. Hence, it is legitimate to apply section 364c of the General Civil
Code of Austria to claims.
99 The Austrian Constitutional Court has decided several times that the claim is subject to article
5 of the Declaration of Human Rights of 1867 (Staatsgrundgesetzffir die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbzirger
[StGG]), which protects the freedom of ownership; cf Pernthaler, Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der
autonomen Rechlssetzung im Arbeitsrecht, 17 ZOR 5 1, n.41 (1967); Pernthaler, Das Problem der verfassungs-
rechilichen Einordnung des Kollekivvertrages, 1 ZErrscHRir FUR ARBEITSRECHT UND SOZIALRECrr 37 n.42
(1966); Klecatsky, Rechtswidrige Schadensverzichts-und Haffungsklauseln in Baubewilligungsbescheiden, 15
ZEITSCHRIFr FUR VERKEHRSRECHT 316 (1970), with further references. Cf HVJBNER, EIGENTUM-
SGARANTIE UND EIGENTUMSBINDUNG 88 (1960), with further references (concerning the German
"Bonner Grundgesetz").
100 This is different from the German Civil Code, which states in section 437 that the seller of a
claim is responsible to the assignee only for the verity but not for its recoverability. This is inconsis-
tent with rules concerning the sale of goods and is economically not justified.
101 On the question of the modus acquirendi in the case of assignments, cf. FROTZ, supra note 14, at
223-25; Pale, Selbmann & Ulrich, Die Zession als Kreditsicherung - Die Sicherungsabtretung von Rechten, 2
QUARTHGZ 12-15, 26-27 (1967).
102 Cf WIEACKER, DEUTSCHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 63 (1941).
103 According to section 929 ("Agreement and delivery. For the transfer of ownership of a mova-
ble thing, it is necessary that the owner of the thing delivers it to the acquirer and that both agree
that the ownership be transferred. If the acquirer is in possession of the thing, the agreement on the
transfer of ownership is sufficient") acquisition of ownership of movable things requires only con-
sent to the transfer of ownership and similarly the assignment is construed "abstractly," as an inde-
feasible legal transaction.
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The reasons that may be cited against treating an obligatio and a ius in
re alike do not greatly affect the problems of the pactum de non cedendo and
the application of section 364c.
However, a bona fide acquisition of an obligation should indeed be
rejected in principle. 10 4 But it should not be rejected merely because in
most cases it would not be possible at all. If a bona fide acquisition were
acknowledged without reserve, a person might suddenly become a
debtor without owing anything, without ever having had any obligatory
relationship with a creditor. But such arguments do not apply in this
context. In the case ofapactum de non cedendo the debtor concerned (obli-
gor) does actually owe something. And if, after all, the intersubjective
relationship between creditor and debtor is no longer confined to these
two parties but, due to the claim's function as an asset, is effective vis-A-
vis third parties, then it is in the interest of the protection of private legal
relationships that the standards used for the acquisition of claims should,
if possible, be the same as those used for the acquisition of corporeal
things. The idea inherent in law that legal and commercial transactions
should be kept free of risks that are unnecessary and unrecognizable for
third persons is effectuated in section 364c, with validity for all
movables. 105
In this context it would be impermissible to argue that it is impossi-
ble to protect private legal relationships which concern claims. Although
this assertion would normally be correct, it is not so in the case of the
pactum de non cedendo. A claim encumbered with apactum that no one can
recognize as such constitutes an important source of uncertainty in eve-
ryday commercial life.106 This uncertainty may be eliminated by includ-
ing the pactum de non cedendo within the purview of section 364c in
accordance with the actual decision of the law. By so doing, the pactum
would merely have relative effect, that is, would only be effective with
respect to the parties to the contract.
Thus, there is no irrefutable argument against the application of sec-
tion 364c of the General Civil Code of Austria to the pactum de non
104 Cf MOECKE, KAUSALE ZESSION UND GUTGLAUBIGER FORDERUNGSERWERB (Thesis) (1962); agree-
ing with himJgggi, Zur "Rechtsnatur" der Zession, 67 SCHWEIZERISCHEJURISTENZErrUNG 6-8, especially
7 (1971). The question of whether the assignment is "abstract" (isolated from other legal transac-
tions) or made with a legal basis is correctly criticized by the author with reference to the field of
Swiss business law.
105 D~iubler, 21 NJW 1120 (1968), concerning section 137, sentence 1 and Bydlinski in KLANG,
supra note 20, at 117-18 (general remarks on these problems).
106 This argumentation may be supported by a comparison with American law. As for Buxbaum
& Crawford, supra note 2, at 338-39, common law provides that claims in principle are not alienable
- distinctions were made according to whether claims were characterized as legal or as equitable
rights. Therefore the effectiveness of a prohibition of assignment was qualified at that time
(although even then it was a controversial matter), since the objective standards for assignability
were themselves controversial. In practice there was great demand for endowing these prohibitions
with binding effect vis-A-vis third parties. Normally a restraint on alienation was viewed as an obliga-
tion which in the case of a breach of contract, guaranteed a payment of compensation for loss. The
increasing role of assignments as security in commercial transactions rendered the old rule both
unnecessary and burdensome. But American legislation has accommodated itself to changed cir-
cumstances in commerce. Cf Mummenhoff, Vertragliches Abtretungsverbot und Sicherungszession im deut-
schen, sterreichischen und U.S. ameikanischen Recht, 34 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZErrUNG (JZ) 429 (1979); J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONMACTS 640-49 (2d ed. 1977).
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cedendo. On the contrary, the application of section 364c is even called
for by the purpose of the provision. Its application is also technically
possible because of the broad construction of res incorporated in section
285 of the General Civil Code of Austria. Therefore, according to Aus-
trian law the pactum should only have a relative effect as between creditor
and debtor so that an assignment contrary to the pactum is valid and
makes the assignor and, under certain circumstances the assignee,10 7 lia-
ble to the debtor for damages.
A. The Opinion of the Austrian Supreme Court
Two striking decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court contrast with
one another. The more recent one (1912) affirms the validity of the pac-
turn de non cedendo with respect to the prospective assignee, 108 the older
one (1908) refers to a case in which the creditor - a carpet dealer - had
agreed not to assign his claim to the remaining purchase price under
penalty of losing this right.109 In its argumentation the court repeatedly
explained that the pactum de non cedendo, which is an agreement between
creditor and debtor under section 861,110 could neither prohibit nor can-
cel the transfer of the claim to third parties. In addition to this bilateral
agreement the parties also stipulated to "a legal consequence in the form
of a condition in case of a breach of the contract." This legal conse-
quence means that the debtor is released from his obligation to perform
the sales contract. Without having added this resolutive condition to the
pactum "the debtor would not be able to effectuate his obvious intent not
to be confronted suddenly with an entirely unknown person;.., because
of this non-compliance (that is, with the pactum by the creditor/assignor)
he could only sue the creditor (assignor) for damages (according to
ABGB section 919)."111 The court could not have said more clearly that
the pactum does not give the debtor an absolute right.
107 Cf infra text accompanying notes 125-37 on the question of the assignee's liability for the
debtor's damages.
108 Sammlung von zivilgerichtlichen Entscheidungen des K.K. Obersten Gerichtshofes, Neue
Folge [G1UNF] 6043, reprinted in 31 ZBL 6 (1913).
109 G1UNF 4363, reprinted in 31 ZBL 88 (1913).
110 Section 861 of the General Civil Code of Austria reads:
Whoever declares that he will transfer his rights to another, that is, that he will permit him
to do something, will give him something, will do something for him, or will omit to do
something on his account, makes a promise. If the other accepts the promise validly, a
contract is created by the mutual consent of both parties. As long as negotiations last and
the promise is not yet given or has not been accepted, either previously or afterwards, no
contract is created.
Baeck, supra note 3, at 163.
11 Section 919 of the old version of the General Civil Code of Austria reads:
If a contract is not at all performed by one party or is not performed in due time, at the
proper place or in the agreed manner, the other party is not entitled to rescind the contract
except the certain cases provided by law or having stipulated reservations expressively - he
may only ask for due performance of the contract and for compensation.
Cf. the latest version of Section 918:
If a contract for consideration is not performed by one of the parties in due time, at the
proper place or in the agreed manner, the other party may accept performance of the con-
tract and damages for delay, or he may, after fixing a period of grace for the performance,
rescind the contract.
Baeck, supra note 3, 175.
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The decision of the court in 1912 was based on the following facts:
an employee of a corporation (sewing machine manufacturers) trans-
ferred a part of his claim for sales commissions, although he had signed a
document entitled "terms (and conditions) of business with respect to
salesmen" which contained apactum with the following formulation: "An
assignment of a claim for a commission is impermissible and has no legal
effect whatsoever for the corporation."'1 2 The court stated as reasons
for its decision that the "stipulated invalidity of an assignment" can only
be interpreted as "a contractual limitation of the claim itself, resulting
from concurrent declarations of intent." One notices the influence of
the new German Civil Code of 1900. But in a decision handed down
only four years ago, the court illustrated another way of interpreting the
"stipulated invalidity of an assignment." ' 13 Other decisions dating from
the time of "Pandektenwissenschaft" also deal with apactum de non cedendo 114
and are based on the same arguments made in this "case of a claim to a
commission."
In a 1982 decision 1 5 the supreme court discussed but did not de-
cide whether or not the assignee has a legitimate interest in suing the
debtor despite the former's knowledge of the pactum de non cedendo. The
decision gave some hope that the court will recognize the pactum as hav-
ing an "inter partes" effect and would abandon its view of the pactum as a
112 In the USA the obligor is protected by substantive limits on assignments: The classic example
of public protection is the prohibition of the assignment of wage claims found in many state statutes.
Public law wants to protect consumers or indigent parties from the temptation of assigning claims
necessary to their own maintenance. See Buxbaum & Crawford, supra note 2, at 342). The consider-
ation that a pactum de non cedendo protects the employee (meaning the creditor) is also found in Ger-
many and Austria. As far as these pacta are concluded within a single contract between employee
and employer they are no different from otherpacta. If they are part of an employment contract their
contents must be treated analogous to conditions and terms of employment. But pacta de non cedendo
concerning wage claims are even found in collective labor agreements, causing some to argue that
assignments of claims necessary to the employees' maintenance could thus be prohibited. This argu-
ment must be criticized with regard to Austrian law; cf Tomandl, Der Kollektivvertrag - doch ein Instru-
ment des Privatrechts, 4 ZAS 209 (1969). It should not be the task of employees' unions to protect the
employees from the temptation of buying on credit. There is neither a typical empirical theory that
workers are less capable than other citizens of representing their own financial interests, nor is there
a causal relation between assignment of wage claims and frequency of accidents at work which would
justify collective protection; NEULOH, RuHE, RuSSEL & MANSOFF, DER ARBErrSUNFALL UND SEINE UR-
SACHEN (1957) (does not give any evidence for a causal relation). Certainly, one must reject the idea
that an employer has a general right to have his employees live without any debts; cf. MAYER-MALY,
ARBErr UND RECHT 2 (1968). Thus, collective pacta de non cedendo must be rejected.
113 I cannot deal with particularities which may arise from "conditions and terms" and the differ-
ent positions of the parties. Cf Section 879 para. 3 of the Austrian Code: A provision in standard
business conditions or standard form contracts not settling one of the main mutual performances is
null and void in any case, if the provision, considering all circumstances of the case, is of gross
disadvantage for one of the parties; see also the Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz of March 8, 1979,
(Consumer Protection Act) § 6.
114 Cf 39 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 146 (1884); 40 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 288 (1885) (concerning apactum
between the guarantor of the obligor and the assignor); judgment of the Reichsgerichtshof (Supreme
Court of the German Reich), 1885 HANSEArISCHE GERICHTSZEITUNG BEIBLATr 75-76 (1885); 31 Ent-
scheidungen des Reichgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 167 (decisions of the Supreme Court of the
German Reich [Reichsgericht] in civil cases); 38 RGZ 309-10; 54 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 392 (1899). Some
decisions specify that the pactum has only relative effect: cf. 2 SEUFFERTS ARCHiv 206 (1848); 5 SEUF-
FERTS ARCHIV 17 (1852) (with reservation for the good faith assignee); 4 ANNALEN DES KONIGLICH
SACHSISCHEN OBERAPPELLATIONSGERICHTS DRESDEN 466-67 (1862); 30 SEUFFERTS ARCHIV 203
(1875).
115 37 EvBL no. 4 (1982), reprinted in 54 SZ no. 110 (1984).
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limitation of the claim itself. But recently (in 1984) an en banc panel of
the court 16 rejected1 17 criticism of this doctrine incurred as a result of
the court's insisting on the absolute binding effect of the pactum de non
cedendo.
The facts of this case are as follows: As agreed, the creditor deliv-
ered goods valued at AS 75.000 to the debtor. The debtor used his or-
der form; on the first side (at a very prominent place) reference was made
to the terms of purchase (printed on the back side of the form). One
provision stated: "Claims for purchase or services may not be trans-
ferred to third parties without our prior written consent." Furthermore,
contrary provisions of the creditor would only be valid if the debtor ap-
proved them. Despite this the creditor irrevocably assigned outstanding
accounts receivable to a bank as security.
After this each invoice sent to the debtor included a notice of assign-
ment, which referred to the transfer of the accounts to the bank. The
debtor neither reacted to these notices nor did he pay anything to the
bank. Nevertheless, he later asked the bank for a confirmation of assign-
ment, an announcement of the transferred claims and documentation of
the declaration of transfer. Although the bank complied with this re-
quest, the debtor payed the creditor (assignor). The bank sued the
(ceded) debtor for recovery of AS 75.000. The debtor asserted the de-
fense of a stipulated pactum de non cedendo.
In this case, too, the supreme court viewed the covenant against as-
signment as having an absolute binding effect. Nevertheless, at the end
of its scrutiny the court used sleight of hand (section 863 of the General
Civil Code of Austria'18) by applying the construction of an implied
waiver" 19 to make findings which again eliminated the undesired binding
validity of this pactum de non cedendo with respect to third parties. With
this decision the court has bolstered its view that a pactum has absolute
binding effect. The court relies on the aforementioned arguments in
favor of a strict interpretation of section 364c of the General Civil Code
of Austria 20 and of the legislature's "obvious intent," which follows
from the Herrenhaus report. 12' The court expressly argued that this de-
cision will promote continuity in the case law relating to section 364c.
116 According to the Law concerning the Austrian Supreme Court (Gesetz iber den Obersten Gericht-
shof [OGHG]) § 6, para. 1, the Austrian Supreme Court normally decides in panels composed of five
judges. Cases concerning very important legal questions or cases in which the traditional court's
opinion should or may be changed are decided by a senate composed of eleven judges (en banc
panel) - section 8 OGHG. The decisions of an en banc panel have the effect of being stare decisis
for the courts of first instance and courts of appeal.
117 106JBL 311 (1984), reprinted in 39 EvBL no. 76 (1984).
118 Section 863 of the General Civil Code of Austria reads:
(1) Intention is manifest not only expressively (sic) by words and generally adopted signs
but also tacitly by acts which in regard to their circumstances reveal an intention beyond
substantial doubt. (2) The custom and usage prevailing in honest transactions must be
taken into consideration in determining the meaning and the effect of acts and omissions.
Baeck, supra note 3, at 164.
119 See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 78.
120 That means the wording relates only to "res" or "ius in rem" but not to a claim; cf my criticism
of this opinion, supra text following note 88.
121 For arguments against this view see Wilhelm, Das Abtretungsverbot in der Entscheidung des ver-
stdrkten Senats, 106JBL 304-05 (1984).
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In refutation of this statement one has to reply that continuity alone
can never guarantee a correct decision. The emphasis on the (historical)
legislature's "obvious intent" is rooted in the general rule of interpreta-
tion of section 6 of the Austrian Code-which reads: "No other interpreta-
tion shall be attributed to a particular provision of the law than that
which is apparent from the plain meaning of the language employed and
from the clear intent of the legislature." Problems arise almost immedi-
ately, because the intention of the legislature is by no means obvious, as
Wilhelm clearly pointed out. 122 Nevertheless, the supreme court viewed
the absolute binding effect of the pactum de non cedendo as the legislature's
obvious intent and only considered the possibility of a loophole in the
law if the economic importance of a claim in its capacity as an asset had
changed as compared to the time when the statute was passed in 1916.
However, the court has denied any such change, for which it is to be and
already has been severely criticized. 123 The court rejects my argument
that section 364c guarantees protection of commerce even if it is not
needed; that is, even if the third person knew about the pactum de non
cedendo (or was bound to know about it). The court argues that this fact
- third persons being protected despite their knowledge of the stipu-
lated pactum - is not the basic idea behind the rule but only a conse-
quence of it. The court maintains that qualifying this consequence as a
principle of the law would be to reproach the legislature with inconsis-
tency. I agree with this "criticism" but it does not adversely affect my
argument. Although advocates of apactum without an absolute effect say
that the protection of third persons is the fundamental idea behind sec-
tion 364c, 124 we do not demand protection in all cases. As far as claims
are concerned, we restrict the "comprehensive" rule - to remain within
the argumentation of the court - of section 364c: The underlying pur-
pose of section 364c is not to protect persons from the danger of a pac-
turn who know about its existence. Therefore section 364c must be
construed restrictively according to its purpose (teleologische reduktion) and
cannot be applied in a case where the assignee knew about the pactum.
Orie also may go another route and hold the assignee who knew about
the pactum liable for damages under certain circumstances.
B. Is the Assignee Liable for Damages?
In a recent case, which will be a leading one, the question arose of
whether the debtor (primary obligor) whose debt has been assigned can
claim compensation for damages from the assignee. But this question
should not occur in connection with the supreme court's view that a stip-
ulated pactum can substantively create or transform a claim into a non-
assignable claim. A third person would not be able to assume the posi-
tion of an assignee.
122 See id
123 See id.
124 The free circulation of goods is only possible in this case; and this free intercourse was - as
even the supreme court admits - the motivation for the legislature to amend the rule.
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However, this question must be addressed from the standpoint of
those who view the pactum de non cedendo as a contract concerning a claim
which, like a contractual covenant prohibiting the sale of a corporeal ob-
ject, is also an asset.
According to the strict interpretation of the principle which defines a
contract as a legal bond only between two persons and according to
which only the parties to the contract must respect its terms, the possibil-
ity that a third party could violate the contract is precluded and an en-
croachment on the primary obligor's (contractual) right through a third
person - the assignee - would be disregarded. 12 5
But Koziol' 2 6 has shown in a convincing manner how this principle
should be and already has changed in modern doctrine and decisions,
especially in connection with the area of inducement to breach a contract
or damages caused by competitive commercial practices which are con-
trary to public policy. Koziol's discourse cannot be repeated here. The
essential point in this context is his conclusion that an encroachment of a
third person's claim may cause liability for damages under certain cir-
cumstances. The Austrian Supreme Court adopted Koziol's doctrinal ar-
gumentation, that is, that a right may be binding upon third persons
under certain circumstances. 127 The creditor's right to demand that the
debtor adhere to his contractual obligation must be protected absolutely.
A person who encroaches upon the creditor's right is liable for damages
caused by changing the debtor's mind. Thus, the following claim in its
capacity as an asset may be the subject of such a violation: when stipulat-
ing to a pactum de non cedendo the debitor cessus obtains the right to prohibit
the creditor from transferring the claim. Without a doubt, the assignor
infringes upon this stipulated right if he transfers the claim of the pri-
mary contract. The question arises of whether the assignee is liable for
damages. According to Koziol's basic concept, the assignee who knows
about the pactum is liable for damages even if he did not induce the as-
signor to break the contract.' 28
125 In this vein see older decisions of the supreme court: G1UNF 2612, 11 SZ no. 151, 16 SZ no.
66.
126 KozIoL, supra note 59, at 271 (given positive reviews by: Ostheim, 4 ZAS 35-36 (1969);
Rother, 169 ACP 271 (1969);.Bydlinski in KLANG, supra note 20, at 112-13, 115-16; critical reviews:
Kramer & Schwimann, 23 OJZ 195-96 (1968)); KRASZER, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL 140 (1968). REHBEIN, VERLETZUNG VON FORDERUNG-
SRECHTEN (1968) and L6WISCH, DER DELnTSSCHTrZ RELATIVER RECHTE (1970) come to Koziol's re-
sult, but with different arguments); cf also MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 25, 30 (1986).
127 91 JBL 213 (1969), reprinted in 41 SZ no. 45; 24 EvBL no. 58 (1969). See the argument supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
128 I do not agree with Koziol's sweeping statement that, because of their influence on a third
person's legal relationships, contractual restraints on assignment should be rights which may be
disregarded by persons affected (Koziol, supra note 59, at 197; see also Bydlinski, 90 JBL 91 (1968)
(on the judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court of.June 6, 1967)). In his article Das vertragliche
Abtretungsverbot, 102 JBL 124-25 (1980), Koziol states that the assignee himself should be liable for
damages, if he knew about the pactum and induced the assignor to breach it, since pacta de non cedendo
appear in the special, legitimate interest of the cessus, which justifies protection from third party
encroachment on his right.
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One has to consider and to weigh129 the following elements which
create the duty to compensate damage'30 caused in connection with an
assignment contrary to the pactum: (1) knowledge of the pactum; (2) the
interest of the primary obligor in attaining an inalienable claim; (3) the
assignee's interest in preventing damage to himself; (4) the extent of the
assignee's influence on the creditor (assignor) to breach the contract.
These elements will weigh more or less heavily depending on the partic-
ular case and special considerations and may create the duty to compen-
sate liability for damages. By recognizing the liability of the assignee' 3'
for damages a way has been found to compensate for the undue hardship
on the obligor which the postulated "inter partes" effect of a pactum may
create.
In its decision of 1984 the supreme court also rejected the argu-
ment 3 2 that the general aim of section 364c is to prevent the owner's
property from being completely tied up. If this were the legislature's
intention it would have had to forbid any kind of pactum, including one
valid only with respect to the contracting parties, because of the possible
liability for damages in case of breach of the pactum and because of possi-
ble penalties stipulated to by the parties. Both possibilities greatly re-
strict the right of economic self-determination. With this argument the
supreme court raises the problematic nature of binding contracts which
offend good morals and effectively changes the subject to this topic.' 3 3
At this point, the central issue of third party or "inter partes" effect is
abandoned.' 3 4
Thus, pursuant to the aforementioned discussion we see that the
duty to perform a contract is not touched by a pactum de non cedendo but
rather only the commercial function of the claim is affected - that is, its
binding effect upon third parties. I also referred to the problematic argu-
ment of the parties' freedom to determine the proper law of contract:
the exercise of this freedom would be binding upon third persons. In
fact, the pactum has the appearance of a contract, containing its commer-
cial function as its subject-matter. Therefore, the general rules of con-
tract law are applicable, especially those setting forth the consequences
of contracts which are against good morals and of parties being bound to
a contract. Consequently, the starting point of all discussion is the par-
129 On the method based upon the idea of a "flexible system" ("bewegliches system") see
WILBURG, BEWEGLICHES SYSTEM IM BURGERLICHEN REcHT (1950); WILBURG, DIE ELEMENTE DES
SCHADENERSATZRECHTS (1941); WILBURG, Zusammenspiel der Krdfte im Aufbau des Schuldrechts, 163 ACP
346-79 (1963); LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 453 (4th ed. 1979) and espe-
dally F. BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE UND RECHTSBEGRIFF 529-43 (1982) with further
references.
130 Cf Wilburg, Zusammenspiel der Krifte im Aufbau des Schuldrechts, 163 ACP 356-57 (1963).
131 Even if the assignee did not know of the pactum, the debtor still retains the possibility of
offsetting his claim of damages (caused by the assignor when he breached the contract - pactum)
against the assignee's claim, since the pactum was stipulated to before the assignment took place; cf
Koziol, 102JBL 124-25 (1980).
132 Id. at 122.
133 In its decision of April 26, 1984, the court held that an agreement to a pactum de non cedendo
itself is not contrary to public morality, 30 ZVR 245 (1985).
134 See GENERAL CIVIL CODE OF AUSTRIA § 879, para. 1: A contract which violates a legal prohibi-
tion or public morality is null and void.
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ties' autonomy, that is, the idea that the contract is valid because each
party, in the exercise of its "self-determination," wanted to create these
legal consequences. 13 5 But to reiterate: freedom of contract does not
permit the parties to create disadvantages for third persons who have no
knowledge of the contract. If the creditor freely renounces the possibil-
ity of assigning the claim, the pactum comes into being as a valid contract.
If the creditor assigns the claim despite a pactum he is liable for damages
according to general rules of contract.'3 6 From the debtor's point of
view there must be a legal interest in his agreeing to a pactum.137 As a
rule this can be easily proved, since the debtor should have the possibil-
ity of (or necessity for) offsetting his claim against those of the creditor.
C. Effects Similar to the Pactum
Let us have a closer look at the phrase "If the claim is transferred, it
shall expire" which is sometimes added to the pactum de non cedendo*138 It
is a resolutory condition that is added to the pactum. If such a condition
were incorporated into the pactum, the pactum would ultimately be bind-
ing upon third parties (the assignee) outside the contractual relationship,
though in a roundabout way.
The problem has been raised with respect to the so-called pactum de
non alienando 139 (contractual prohibition of alienation). There we find
phrases like "If the thing is sold contrary to contractual prohibition, title
to this thing shall pass to a third party or to the contracting party of the
pactum de non alienando." Based on the underlying purpose of section
364c as previously discussed, it should be impossible to combine a con-
tract concerning a corporeal thing which is to be qualified as a res in com-
mercio 140 with a restriction of that quality, especially when this limitation
is unrecognizable for third parties. Therefore, if one considers that even
the lesser restraint, that is to say thepactum de non alienando, should not be
valid with respect to third persons, it would contravene the spirit of sec-
tion 364c of the Austrian Civil Code to nullify this result by permitting
even greater restrictions, namely, allowing the alienation to be declared
null and void while at the same time returning the property to the alie-
nor. Consequently, if the law is interpreted correctly, this resolutory
condition constitutes an illegal circumvention of the law. 14 1 In this case
the fundamental idea of keeping legal and commercial intercourse free
135 FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BijRGERLICHEN RECHTS: DAS RECHTSGESCHXFT 7 (3d ed. 1979);
see BYDLINSKI, supra note 38, at 56-62 (developing a new doctrine, a combined theory of the legal
transaction).
136 Cf GIUNF 4363.
137 Cf infra note 143.
138 Cf the "case of the carpet dealer," 27 ZBL 88 (1909). The supreme court also mentions the
resolutory condition in the case published in 106JBL 312 (1984).
139 1 EHRENZWEIG, SYSTEM DES OSTERREICHISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN PRIVATRECHTS, TEIL 2:
SACHENRECHT 166 (1957). For German law see FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BUiRGERLICHEN
RECHTS § 17, no. 7 (1979); Diubler, 21 NJW 1119 (1968) and recently TIMM, 44JZ 13 (1989).
140 Cf HEINZ HiJBNER, DER RECHTSVERLUST IM MOBILIARSACHENRECHT 139-44 (1955); Wieacker,
Sachbegrzff, Sacheinheit und Sachzuordnung, 148 ACP 72 (1943).
141 Cf EHRENZWEIG, supra note 139, at 166. Since each circumvention of the law constitutes at
least a violation of the law, the expression chosen is of no consequence in the final analysis. On the
equalization of "in fraudem legis agere" with "contra legem agere," cf. PFAFF, ZUR LEHRE VOM
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from unnecessary risks curbs the general principle of freedom of contract
which would permit one to include in a contractual relationship this type
of resolutory condition.
In the case of the pactum de non cedendo the situation is similar. The
expedient of a resolutory condition only appears to be the ideal legal
construction for making the pactum de non cedendo binding upon third par-
ties, neither forcing the abandonment of the basic idea that an obligation
is a legal bond only between two persons nor compelling the adoption of
the thesis of an inalienable claim created by contractual act. As a result
of the free will of the parties, the resolutory condition transforms the
claim into an inalienable one.142 This is an unlawful consequence if the
claim were an assignable (alienable) one before, 143 especially when the
security of legal relationships is required: Third persons (assignees) who
do not know about the resolutory condition will be disappointed in their
belief that the (effectively non-assignable) claim is alienable.
Despite the supreme court's opinion that the pactum is effective vis-A-
vis third parties, the court held in this specific case that the assignee is
allowed to sue the debtor. The court assumed that the debtor had made
an implied waiver of his right by subsequent ratihabitio of the invalid as-
signment.' 44 In principle the court states that the binding nature of the
pactum vis-a-vis all persons guarantees optimal protection of the debtor.
But since "considerations, even if orientated on political and economic
assessments, do not allow a definite value judgment,"' 145 the court
reserves the possibility of intervention with the help of sections 863 (im-
plied waiver or implied ratihabitio) and 879 (public morality) of the Gen-
eral Civil Code of Austria for cases where the debtor does not need this
protection or where the creditor's interests are stronger.' 46 I shall pick
out an example of the reaction of legal scholars to this point of view:
Wilhelm 147 says we have to accept the binding effect of the pactum on all
persons because of the court's decision. But he argues that a discussion
of the problematic nature of this pactum should only be an "academic
question," since practice furnishes enough possibilities for avoiding this
effect. Besides this possibility the court itself offers the alternative that
SOGENANNTEN IN FRAUDEM LEGIS AGERE, Cf. 161-66 (1892); ENNECCERUS - NIPPERDEY, supra note 70, at
1160, with further references (on the problematic nature of thefraus legis).
142 Diubler, 21 NJW 1118, n.18 (1968).
143 See AusTRmN GENERAL CIVIL CODE § 1393: "All alienable rights may be assigned. Rights
which are inherent in a person and which consequently cease with his or her death cannot be as-
signed. Bearer bonds are assigned by their delivery and do not require any proof of assignment
besides possession." Baeck, supra note 3, at 272.
144 Because of the facts of the case, it is doubtful if this decision was actually correct. Cf. supra
note 15 and Wilhelm, 106 JBL 308 (1984); Iro, 2 RDW 103 (1984). The court seems to have an-
swered this criticism in a case with similar merits [108 JBL 383 (1986)] where it gave better reasons
for assuming an implied waiver of the debtor.
145 This means an evaluation of who, as between the creditor and debtor, needs more protection.
This judgment should be based on the law and its underlying purpose; political and economic as-
sessments often. vary and judges in particular cannot change the law as often as these evaluations
may change because of the detrimental effect upon legal certainty that this would have (argument
based upon the principle of the separation of powers).
146 So the court argues [108JBL 384 (1986)] that the implied waiver of a party's assertion of the
pactum "is absolutely suggestive in an economical view."
147 1O6JBL 307 (1984); see also Mayrhofer, 23 OJZ 146, 169 (1973) (undisclosed assignment).
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the would-be assignee could attach the claim (as is recognized in Aus-
trian legal doctrine and case law in the absence of a legal provision simi-
lar to section 851 paragraph 2 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure).1 48 Wilhelm points out several ways for avoiding the pactum
de non cedendo that can nonetheless produce the same result: The first
method of circumvention is an agreement between the creditor and the
would be assignee to which the creditor consents prior to an attachment
of the debt (against the primary debtor). A second one is to have the
would-be assignee pay the debt to the creditor pursuant to sections
1358,14 9 1422,150 and 1042 of the Code. 151 The would-be assignee then
acquires his own claim against the primary debtor with the same sub-
stance as before. A third way already existed in classical Roman law' 5 2 in
the form of a mandate to sue for the assignee's own benefit as a represen-
tative of the creditor; the primary debtor and creditor could stipulate that
the debtor pay the representative as the creditor's collecting agent (solu-
tionis causa adiectus).
The Austrian Supreme Court appears to view section 863 and if nec-
essary section 879 of the Austrian Code as the only ways to avoid the
undesired effects of a pactum. The question of whether the free circula-
tion of claims should be protected (with the exception of the good faith
acquisition of a claim by reason of the ostensible existence of a negotia-
ble claim) remains unanswered. 153 In the final analysis, one must say that
the decision of the en banc panel of the court did not resolve the
problems which exist in the field of commerce. A debtor cannot count
on the pactum as an absolute right .. the court reserves possibilities for
eliminating the effect of the pactum. But the creditor, too, cannot be as-
sured that the court will invariably decide that the pactum is not effective.
The handicap remains. Each acquisition of a claim will require an inquiry
as to the debitor cessus, regardless of whether a restraint on prohibition is
stipulated or not. 154
VII. Final Remarks
Finally, we must state the paradox: In Germany, section 399 of the
Civil Code provides that the contractual prohibition of assignment is ab-
148 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
149 A person who pays the debt of another which he has assumed, either personally or in
regard to certain assets, is subrogated to all the rights of the creditor and is entitled to
demand the restitution of the amount paid by him from the debtor. For that purpose, the
satisfied creditor shall deliver to the payor all pertinent documents and means of security.
Baeck, supra note 3, at 265.
150 "A person who, without a legal obligation, pays the debt of another may, before payment or at
the time payment is made, demand from the creditor the assignment of his rights; in the event of
such demand, the payment has the effect of a discharge." Id at 277.
151 "A person who incurs for another an expense which the latter, according to the law, would
have been obliged to incur himself, is entitled to demand compensation therefore." Ia at 281.
152 See supra note 7.
153 The court's rejection of Frotz's opinion is correct. Cf argument supra note 15.
154 And this is the existing situation, even though the court believes that the third party is not
obliged to inquire into matters relating to outside claims in private legal relationships (OGH in 52
SZ no. 110: the assignor, though obliged by a factoring contract, advised his debtors to pay a third
party immediately and not pay the factor at all. The third party acquired a valid claim).
[Vol. 64:171
1989] CONTRACTUAL PROHIBITION OF ASSIGNMENT 199
solutely effective (even with respect to third parties). The new German
doctrine claims either to eliminate the second alternative of section 399,
because of its burden on the security of legal relations or at least de-
mands that the statute be interpreted to require good faith and good
morals so as to achieve a relative effectiveness of the prohibition. In Aus-
tria there is no provision like section 399, second alternative; on the con-
trary, section 364c of the General Civil Code of Austria endows a pactum
with validity only for the parties to the contract, but the Austrian
Supreme Court and some legal scholars quite unnecessarily take the con-
tents of the second alternative provision of section 399 of the German
Civil Code and incorporate them into Austrian law, thereby promulgat-
ing the absolute binding effect of the contractual prohibition of assign-
ment - an astonishing result.
